Racial and ethnic profiling of airline passengers is back in the news again. The argument in favor is that it would be costly to mount a careful examination of all airline passengers. Assuming that such profiling is effective, it means that the costs of the acquired safety benefits are borne by a subset of the population. There is a way to redress this inequity. A profiling tax charged to all passengers. Proceeds from such a tax are paid to those who are profiled. Clearly, there are implementation issues but………..
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5 comments
December 28, 2009 at 9:17 pm
Agent Continuum
But wouldn’t this make the non-profiled potentially worse off? The tax needs to be paid by those that are better off due to the screening (which might include the non-profiled passages). Maybe then the tax should be paid out of a broad tax base.
December 28, 2009 at 10:07 pm
rvohra
Sorry, didn’t follow. The non-profiled are better off because they are not subject to an invasive search and enjoy greater safety.
December 29, 2009 at 12:08 am
noamnisan
But then, doesn’t efficiency demand that everyone pay his own marginal cost? E.g., I would assume that men are more dangerous than women in reality and are deemed so by the screening rules (but only the second point is really important for this discussion). Thus the true marginal cost to put a man on the plane is higher than the cost of putting a woman.
January 3, 2010 at 3:52 pm
rvohra
Even the value of the time saved from not being screened would vary amongst individuals. That would also be an argument for having a discriminatory tax.
December 29, 2009 at 3:05 am
Agent Continuum
You are right. I was thinking of the wrong endowment. If the endowment is “random searches and everyone gets to draw” then getting off the hook, in expectations, makes the non-profiled people strictly better off.