http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/2012/07/29/an-infinite-horizon-perfect-information-extensive-form-game-without-a-subgame-perfect-%ce%b5-equilibrium/ Wed, 17 Apr 2013 04:20:42 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.com/ http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/2012/07/29/an-infinite-horizon-perfect-information-extensive-form-game-without-a-subgame-perfect-%ce%b5-equilibrium/#comment-2165 Wed, 15 Aug 2012 19:01:15 +0000 http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/?p=2388#comment-2165 [...] a previous post I described an infinite-horizon perfect-information game without a subgame-perfect equilibrium. [...]

]]> http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/2012/07/29/an-infinite-horizon-perfect-information-extensive-form-game-without-a-subgame-perfect-%ce%b5-equilibrium/#comment-2026 Fri, 03 Aug 2012 21:10:29 +0000 http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/?p=2388#comment-2026 I feel that there is a missing argument in the paragraph starting “By levy’s 0-1 law.” I think the argument for this point is that *if* Bob always picks A then he achieves at least 2, hence any epsilon-optimal strategy for Bob must not ever absorb with B, and *now* the 0-1 law kicks in, because the limsup of the conditional probability of absorbing at A is now at least epsilon and the law says it converges to 0 or 1. If this point does not require such an argument, I am curious…

]]> http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/2012/07/29/an-infinite-horizon-perfect-information-extensive-form-game-without-a-subgame-perfect-%ce%b5-equilibrium/#comment-1966 Mon, 30 Jul 2012 07:25:23 +0000 http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/?p=2388#comment-1966 [...] …No Subgame-Perfect ε-Equilibrium – Leisure of the Theory Class [...]

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