Aviad Heifetz is a Professor in the Department of Management and Economics in the Open University of Israel. He is the author of the textbook Strategic Thinking – Game Theory with Economics and Business Applications (Hebrew, English translation forthcoming). His research in game theory and economic theory provided insights into the evolution of preferences, market design, bargaining, competitive economies with asymmetric information and interactive epistemology. He serves on the editorial boards of Games and Economic Behavior and Mathematical Social Sciences.
Eran Shmaya is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences at Northwestern University. His research areas are game theory, probability and information theory. He is currently working on infinite games. He is also interested in applications of game theory in the natural sciences.
Eilon Solan is a Professor in the Department of Statistics and Operations Research at Tel Aviv University. His areas of expertise include game theory, stochastic processes, and measure theory. Professor Solan is an Associate Editor for Mathematics of Operations Research, for the International Journal of Game Theory, for the Journal of Mathematical Economics, and for Dynamic Games and Applications. He is a member of the Advisory Board to Transactions Network Optimization and Control.
Rakesh Vohra is the John K. and Helen Kellogg Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences at Northwestern University. He is also Director of the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. He has published widely in game theory and operations research. His area of expertise is auction theory and pricing. In addition he serves on a number of editorial boards and is co-editor of the International Journal of Game Theory.
Jonathan Weinstein is an Associate Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University. His general areas of research are game theory, decision theory and microeconomic theory. His publications have concerned the impact of higher-order uncertainty on strategic interactions; and testing supposed experts who make probabilistic forecasts that may be strategically motivated.