Inspired by Daron Acemoglu’s Schwartz lecture last month, I buckled down to reading Acemoglu and Robinson. Their goal is to understand why democracy (broadly defined) emerges and why it persists. Here is a rough rendition of their arguments.
In the beginning a small elite controls the allocation and consumption of resources. Eventually, the masses solve a collective action problem and agitate for what they have been denied; bread, cloth, shelter and control rights. Why don’t the elite buy the masses off with a promise of bread, cloth, shelter and the occasional roman circus but not control rights? It because, as Hume says, the bonds of words are to weak. The masses get bread and etc. today but what about tomorrow? The promises of the elite are not credible. Organizing to agitate again is costly, so to guarantee bread and etc. for the future the masses need an institution that will credibly deliver on the promises extracted from the elite. That institution is democracy.
A crucial piece of the argument is that the collective action problem the masses must solve to agitate for their needs, is costly. It requires that like minded individuals must coordinate (I will turn out to protest only if I know enough others will do so as well) and that risk to life and limb is reduced (by spreading it over a large enough number of individuals). Social networks, supposedly reduce these costs. Marry this with Acemoglu and Robinson, and it suggests that democracy is less likely to emerge! If the cost of agitation drops, then it becomes easier to enforce the promises of the elites by threat of agitation. This diminishes the incentives to push for a change in political institutions.
6 comments
June 9, 2011 at 1:05 pm
pr
I guess that actually means the difference between democracy and non-democracy is getting smaller and smaller.
June 9, 2011 at 3:17 pm
afinetheorem
Actually, Michael Chwe, who did his PhD here at Northwestern, finished this argument. The link between social networks and coordination is not obvious, actually. Networks that are not “clustered” allow the “idea of revolution” to spread quickly, but networks that are clustered allow our small group to coordinate and get out to the central square. Lower costs of communication, per se, won’t affect democratization unless they change that tradeoff. This model is mostly developed in the polisci lit, but Chwe has a ReStud (I think 2000) that covers most of this ground.
June 10, 2011 at 4:33 pm
rvohra
Dear afinetheorem
thanks for the pointer.
rakesh
June 10, 2011 at 4:31 pm
rvohra
Dear pr
I suppose, yes, if what matters are outcomes rather than procedure. This line reasoning suggests that frequent threats of agitation may achieve the same outcome as democracy.
July 5, 2011 at 6:43 pm
NP2012
Doesn’t social media also reduce the cost of information dissemination and therefore also potentially reduce the cost of running the institution of democracy?
July 5, 2011 at 10:18 pm
rvohra
Dear NP2012
while the web can increase reach and improve targetability I don’t view the cost of transmission as being a major component of the costs of democracy. In any focusing just on transmission of info ignores the main bottleneck……getting a voters attention. In my view, the difficulty of getting a voters attention has actually increased. If the cost of transmitting goes down, it encourages more people to transmit, hence more competition for attention.